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Abstract
Theory suggests that transfers should have an effect on local fiscal policy that is
similar to an equivalent increase in local incomes. Yet much of the empirical literature
shows that local governments use transfers primarily to increase expenditures. Recent
contributions have revisited this so called flypaper effect by using quasi-experimental
methods, and some have found that the evidence for the flypaper effect dissipates once
endogeneity of transfer receipts is accounted for. This paper contributes to the growing
body of quasi-experimental research on the flypaper effect by exploiting a natural ex-
periment in the German state of Hesse. Using discontinuities in the Hessian municipal
transfer allocation formula to construct a set of instruments for municipal transfer re-
ceipts during the 2001-2010 period, it provides strong evidence in favor of the flypaper
effect.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal capacities typically vary between the sub-national jurisdictions of a country: some
regions have access to abundant tax bases while others find it difficult to collect sufficient
tax revenues. Since most countries consider geographical differences in living conditions
to be a problem, they attempt to equalize fiscal capacities between regions by means of
equalization transfers. There appears to be a political consensus that for reasons of national
unity, public goods consumption should not differ too much between individuals that live in
different regions of a country. Beyond such political considerations, the case for equalization
transfers can also be made in terms of economic efficiency. With diminishing marginal
utility of consumption, a reduction in consumption differentials between regions will result
in a net-welfare gain for the country as a whole. Alternatively, equalization transfers can also
be perceived as a insurance scheme that protects regions against asymmetric fiscal shocks
(Bucovetsky, 1998).
Whatever the goals that the central government wants to pursue with transfers, they are
fungible. Local governments can use transfers either to expand expenditures or to reduce
taxes. Theoretically, the effects of an increase in transfer receipts on local fiscal policy
should be similar to an equivalent increase in local incomes (Bradford and Oates, 1971).
According to standard median voter theory, local governments should use a certain share of
the transfers to increase expenditures while using the remainder to reduce taxes. However,
much of the early empirical literature on this issue has found that transfers tend to increase
expenditures too much relative to the theoretical benchmark and decrease taxes too little
(Hines and Thaler, 1995). This phenomenon is usually named the flypaper effect: “money
sticks where it hits”.
One obvious problem that the empirical literature on the flypaper effect faces is the endo-
geneity of transfers to the fiscal decisions made by local governments. In particular omitted
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variables complicate the empirical analysis. For example, observing a positive association
between transfers and tax rates cannot be interpreted as proof that transfers are not used
to reduce tax rates. It is possible that regions that choose high tax rates for some un-
observed reason witness an outflow of tax bases and are then compensated by the central
government by means of higher transfers. Similarly, observing a positive correlation between
transfers and expenditures does not indicate a causal effect. For example, unobserved leg-
islative changes at some higher tier of government may increase both transfers receipts and
expenditure obligations.
Since is questionable whether the early empirical literature has sufficiently addressed such
endogeneity problems, the evidence in favor of the flypaper effect provided in this literature is
suspect. Indeed, several recent contributions using quasi-experimental methods find that the
flypaper effect disappears once endogeneity is accounted for. Knight (2002), for example, uses
political variables to instrument for federal highway aid grants in the US and finds no evidence
for the flypaper effect. Gordon (2004) uses a discontinuity in the allocation formula for school
grants in the US and finds that the flypaper effect vanishes once endogeneity is accounted
for and the specification is made sufficiently flexible to allow for delayed adjustments.
Yet the quasi-experimental evidence on the existence of the flypaper effect is not unambi-
gious. Apart from questioning the identification strategy in Knight (2002), Dahlberg et al.
(2008) point out that Knight (2002) and Gordon (2004) use very specific grant programs.
Dahlberg et al. (2008) therefore focus on general purpose transfers paid by the Swedish cen-
tral government to its municipalities and apply an identification strategy that is based on
discontinuities in the grant allocation formula. More specifically, the exploit the fact that
Swedish municipalities that have outmigration flows above 2% within a certain time-frame
receive extra grants while those below do not. Exploiting this disontinuity in a instrumen-
tal regression framework, they find strong evidence in favor of the flypaper effect. Swedish
municipalities appear to use grants almost exclusively to increase spending.
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Against the backdrop of this mixed evidence, I study in this paper the flypaper effect
with a dataset covering 414 municipalities1 in the German state of Hesse over the period
2001-2010.2 More specifically, I investigate whether equalization transfers affect total public
expenditures, the business tax rate multiplier, or the property tax rate multiplier of Hessian
municipalities.
The main contribution of this paper is a convincing identification of the effect of equaliza-
tion transfers on fiscal policy. Identification is facilitated by a unique feature of the Hessian
municipal fiscal equalization law that results in a natural experiment. According to the Hes-
sian equalization law, transfers to a municipality are determined by comparing a measure
of its fiscal need to a measure of its fiscal capacity. If the fiscal capacity of a municipality
falls short of its fiscal need, equalization transfers are paid such that fiscal capacity reaches a
certain fraction of the assessed fiscal need. The fiscal capacity measure is based on available
own tax revenues per capita. Fiscal need, on the other hand, is a positive function of pop-
ulation size that increases disproportionately. In a nutshell, the equalization law presumes
that more populated municipalities have disproportionately larger fiscal needs. Therefore,
an otherwise identical inhabitant receives a larger weight in the calculation of the fiscal need
measures during the equalization process if she lives in a larger municipality. And because
of this feature of the law, larger municipalities will receive ceteris paribus more transfers per
capita.
That inhabitants of larger municipalities receive a larger weight in the fiscal need formula is
a common feature of the municipal equalization laws of almost all German States. However,
1Hesse has 426 municipalities. This number includes five so called cities with county status and seven
cities with a special status. These twelve cities have more responsibilities and a different financial structure
than the standard municipality. I therefore do not include them in the dataset.
2I focus on this period because the most recent Hessian State Develop-
ment Plan (Landesentwicklungsplan) was passed in the second half of 2000 (see
http://www.landesplanung-hessen.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/LEP_Text.pdf). Among other
determinations, state development plans define which municipalities are to be treated as regional centers.
Such designations are important for the allocation of transfers. See below for more details.
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Hesse is unique in that the relationship between weights and population size is discontinuous
(Lenk and Rudolph, 2003).3 At various thresholds, the weight of each inhabitant increases
discontinuously. For example, inhabitants of municipalities below 5000 inhabitants receive a
weight of 107 in the equalization formula, whereas inhabitants of municipalities above 5000
and below 7500 receive a weight of 121. Consequently, a municipality with 5001 inhabitants
will receive, ceteris paribus, about 13% more transfers per capita than a municipality with
5000 inhabitants. That is, crossing the threshold from 5000 to 5001 will increase the weight
of all inhabitants in the municipality for the determination of transfers, and this will result
in a discontinuous increase in transfers.
Because of this feature of the Hessian equalization law, the weight bracket in which a
municipality falls according to its population size should be a significant predictor of the
transfers it will receive. Therefore, dummy variables indicating the various brackets can be
used as instruments to identify the effect of transfers on local expenditures and taxation –
as long as municipal fiscal capacity does not change with population size.
In reality, however, municipalities that fall into different population brackets will have
different fiscal capacities. Unfortunately, I do not have data available on the fiscal capacity
measures used to determine transfers during the equalization process. Moreover, fiscal ca-
pacity is to some extent an outcome variable as it is determined by the tax and expenditure
policies of municipalities, which in turn will be affected by transfers. It is therefore inap-
propriate to control for fiscal capacity explicitly (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, as
shown below municipal tax revenues per capita – a variable that is related but not identical
to fiscal capacity as defined by the equalization law- increase in population size, indicating
that controlling for population size is sufficient to account of differences in fiscal capacity.
Indeed, the dummy variables for the various population weight brackets turn out to be
3See also Anlage 1 of the Hessian fiscal equalization law, i. e. the Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FAG)
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strong instruments for transfers per capita once the first stage is conditioned on municipal
population size.
Apart from ensuring instrument strength, controlling for population size also plays an
essential role in ensuring the validity of the dummy variables for the different weight brackets
as instruments. The identifying assumption in the instrumental variables regressions is
that the weight bracket in which a municipality falls according to its population size only
affects expenditures or taxes by affecting transfers and has therefore no direct effect on
the outcome variables. This exclusion restriction is clearly demanding in its unconditional
form. Indeed, larger municipalities receive bigger weights in the Hessian equalization formula
precisely because of the presumption that they have more expenditure needs. Consequently,
population size should be included as a control variable.
Including only population size alone may not be sufficient to achieve conditional indepen-
dence of the instrument, however. There may be additional factors that are correlated with
both the population brackets and the outcome variables but are not sufficiently picked up
by population size. This issue boils down to whether municipalities that fall into different
population brackets are comparable after conditioning on population size.
The assumption that municipalities that fall into a lower bracket represent a valid control
group for municipalities that fall into higher brackets (and are thus treated with larger
weights) is defensible for brackets that are close to each other. For example, municipalities
with population sizes between 5001 and 7500 are a reasonable control group for municipalities
that fall into the next higher bracket of 7501 to 10000 (and vice versa). It is more difficult to
defend this assumption for municipalities that fall into the 20001 to 30000 bracket or even
higher brackets. Very large municipalities might pursue different fiscal policies than smaller
ones not only because of population size differences but also for some unobserved reason. I
deal with this problem by including only municipalities with population size below 20000 in
the baseline regressions. However, I will consider municipalities with up to 30000 inhabitants
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in a robustness check. Around 85% of all Hessian municipalities have a population size below
20000.
Restricting the sample to relatively comparable municipalities is particularly important in
view of the fact that I cannot include municipal fixed effects in the instrumental variables
regressions. The reason for this is that there are only very few transitions of municipalities
from one to another weight bracket during the 2001-2010 period. Given the small number of
transitions, there is not sufficient within variation in the instruments to significantly predict
the within variation in transfers per capita in the first stage. However, I will control for
several time-varying control variables, in addition to time fixed effects and lagged dependent
variables.
The closest precedent to this paper is Dahlberg et al. (2008), which uses a similar method-
ology to study the flypaper effect in Sweden. With respect to recent evidence on the effects of
transfers from Germany, Buettner (2006) uses a regression discontinuity framework to explore
whether equalization transfers limit tax competition in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
His study differs from this paper in that it focuses on the effect of the equalization rate4
on the local tax choice. In a nutshell, he investigates if municipalities that face a higher
equalization rate have fewer incentives to attract mobile firms by choosing lower business
tax rates. He does not study how transfers as a whole affect fiscal policy and his results offer
few implications regarding the flypaper effect. Egger et al. (2010) study the same question as
Buettner (2006) with data from the state of Lower-Saxony. In contrast to Buettner (2006),
they rely on a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effects of transfers on local
business tax rates. However, they reach similar conclusions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a over-view
of how municipalities are financed in Hesse and discusses the municipal equalization scheme
4The equalization rate refers to the share of the shortfall between assessed fiscal need and fiscal capacity
that is compensated by general purpose transfers.
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in detail. Section 3 establishes that the discontinuties in the Hessian equalization law can
be exploited to construct strong instruments for transfer receipts of municipalities. Section
4 presents the empirical model. Section 5 presents the results. A conclusion is offered in
Section 6.
2 Fiscal arrangements in Hesse
Germany is constitutionally a two tier federation. Only the federal and state tiers posses
sovereignty. Administratively, however, there are up to five tiers. Below the federal and the
state tier, the federation is divided into Regierungsbezirke, Kreise (counties) and Kreisfreie
Sta¨dte (cities with county status), and Gemeinden (municipalities). The lowest tier are
the municipalities. The next higher tier are the counties, which always comprise several
municipalities. Cities with county status are a hybrid arrangement that are simultaneously
responsible for municipal and county tasks.5 A Regierungsbezirk is comprised of several
counties and cities with county status and is in general responsible for some higher level
administrative tasks. The counties are responsible for tasks that have a wider geographical
scope, for example for organizing the short-distance public traffic system, garbage collection,
and the control of foodstuffs. On the revenue side, they rely mostly on transfers from state
governments and contributions from the municipalities that are located within the county in
question (Kreisumlage). The Regierungsbezirke only exist in a few states and their specific
responsibilities vary. Municipalities, cities with county status, and counties exist in all sixteen
states of the federation.
In the following, I will focus on the municipalities and disregard the other administrative
tiers. Despite being the lowest tier of government, the municipalities play an highly impor-
tant role in the administrative and fiscal landscape of the federation. On the expenditure
5As indicated previously, there are seven large towns that are technically municipalities but have respon-
sibilities akin to cities with county status (municipalities/towns with special status).
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side of the budget, they are responsible for the provision of several important public goods,
for example schools, law and order, and local infrastructure. On the revenue side, they
can independently levy user fees and set certain tax rates. Of these, two are important for
municipal budgets: the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the local tax on buildings
and estates (Grundsteuer B). I will refer to the Grundsteuer B henceforth as property tax.
Technically, the municipalities do not choose a rate for these taxes, but a multiplier on a
federation-wide base rate. In practice, the multiplier determines the effective tax rate for
these two taxes, and I will use the terms tax multiplier and tax rates interchangeably.
Apart from own source revenues, municipalities receive revenues from several taxes that
are shared with the state and federal tier. They are entitled to a fraction of income and value
added tax revenues that is collected within their administrative boundaries. While revenues
from these taxes typically constitutes a large share of municipal income, municipalities are
not allowed to set the rates. Income and value added tax rates are the same throughout the
federation.
Finally, municipalities in all states receive transfers from their state government. The
transfer systems function in very general terms as follows. A fiscal capacity measure is
calculated for each municipality based on municipal tax revenues. This measure is then
compared to a fiscal need measure. If fiscal capacity falls short of fiscal need, the munic-
ipality in question receives a fraction of the shortfalls. If fiscal capacity exceeds the fiscal
need, the municipality receives, depending on the state, either some minimum amount of
transfers, no transfers, or has to transfer some of its revenues to the state government or
other municipalities.
The specific rules that govern the allocation of transfers differ between states. In the
following, I describe the transfer system in the state of Hesse since I will use Hessian data
in the empirical analysis. This state is located in the middle of Germany (See Figure 2 for a
map). It is one of the wealthier states of the German federation. In the equalization system
9
between states (La¨nderfinanzausgleich), it has always been a net-payer. Politically, it has
witnessed both right- and left-wing governments during its history. Its geographical extent
and the number of inhabitants, about six million, is average for Germany. The distribution
of the population into municipalities largely follows a standard Zipf’s Law, as indicated by
Figure 4 which shows the histogram of municipal population sizes.
The municipal equalization scheme in Hesse works as follows. The Hessian state govern-
ment first determines the total amount of resources that are to be used for transfers. This
amount is a political decision and varies between years. In general, it depends on the fiscal
situation of the state government. If state revenues have been large in a given year, more
resources are typically available for transfers and vice versa.
Once the total amount of resources to be paid as transfers has been determined, spe-
cific fractions of the total amount are allocated for different transfer programs. The most
important transfer programs are general purpose transfers to the different administrative
tiers (Schlu¨sselzuweisungen) and special purpose transfers, for example for the financing of
schools and local roads.
About half of all resources allocated to the transfer programs are typically used to fund
general purpose transfers to the municipalities and counties. The share allocated to the
municipalities is divided between them according to the municipal equalization law. As in all
German states, the law defines measures for fiscal capacity and fiscal need of a municipality.
As indicated previously, the measure for fiscal capacity is based on tax revenues. It is not
identical to tax revenues, however, because for certain municipal taxes, most notably the
business and property taxes, hypothetical instead of the real rates are used in conjunction
with the actual tax bases to calculate hypothetical tax revenues. The idea is that with
such an adjustment, the fiscal capacity measure reflects the municipal potential to raise
revenues more accurately than raw tax revenues. The intention behind this adjustment is
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that municipalities that obtain tax revenues only because they set higher tax rates and not
because they posses more valuable tax bases should not be punished by lower transfers.
The fiscal capacity measure is compared with a fiscal need measure. For the unconditional
grant program, fiscal need is primarily a function of population size. There is the presumption
in Hesse as in almost all German states, that expenditure needs increase disproportionally
in population size. Irrespective of the validity of this presumption, it is a fact that municipal
equalization laws typically allow for what is called Einwohnerveredlung when calculating the
fiscal need of a municipality. That is, inhabitants of municipalities are weighted according to
the total population size of the municipality. Therefore, the assessed fiscal need per capita
typically increases in with population size.
Most states with Einwohnerveredlung use a smooth weight function. That is, a small
increase in population size in a municipality results in an equivalently small increase in the
weight of each inhabitant when calculating the fiscal need measure. Hesse, however, is unique
in that it employs a discontinuous function to map population size to weights. A marginal
increase in population size does typically not affect the weight of a municipal inhabitant.
But at certain thresholds, a marginal increase results in a large jump in the weight of all
inhabitants of a municipality.
Table 1 shows the weight function (Hauptansatz ) according to the equalization law.6 In-
habitants of municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants receive a weight of 107, once a
municipality has 5001 inhabitants each of them receives a weight of 114, and so forth for
all thresholds until 50000 inhabitants.7 This weighting procedure gives fictional population
sizes for the municipalities. Total fiscal need is then calculated by multiplying the fictional
municipal population size by a “basic amount” (Grundbetrag). The basic amount varies
between years and is determined endogenously such that resources allocated to general pur-
6The Finanzausgleichsgesetz from which these figures are obtained is accessible online under
http://www.rv.hessenrecht.hessen.de.
7There are some additional weighting procedures for specific municipalities. See below.
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pose transfers equal actual transfer payment. The basic amount does not differ between
municipalities in a given year, however.
Once total fiscal need is calculated according to this formula, it is contrasted with the
total fiscal capacity of a municipality. If fiscal capacity falls below fiscal need, a fraction
of the difference is completely equalized. More specifically, any shortfall in fiscal capacity
below 80% of fiscal need is completely equalized. Shortfalls in fiscal capacity above 80%
are equalized with a rate of 1/2. If fiscal capacity is larger than fiscal need (i. e. if the
municipality in question is fiscally abundant), this municipality only receives a minimum
amount of general purpose transfers. In Hesse, the minimum transfers vary by population
size.8
3 Transfers and Thresholds
The weighting formula for calculating fiscal need should induce a discontinuity in actual
transfer receipts at the population thresholds. Everything else equal, transfers per capita
should be constant for population sizes within the threshold but display discontinuous jumps
at the thresholds. In practice, the ceteris paribus assumption is untenable. Fiscal capacities,
in particular, will vary with population size, which will result in a non-constant relation-
ship between transfers per capita and population size within and between the thresholds.
Nonetheless, there should be discontinuous jumps at the thresholds. This is confirmed by
Panel a of Figure 3 in which the the empirical distribution of population size is plotted
against transfers per capita for Hessian municipalities in the period 2001-2010. In this
figure, I exclude municipalities that have been identified as outliers according to the Hadi-
8Fiscally abundant municipalities with with less than 7500 inhabitants receive 5 Euro per inhabitant,
municipalities between 7501 and 30000 inhabitants receive 7 Euros, and municipalities with more than
50000 receive 15 Euro per inhabitant. Certain municipalities, i. e. those designated as central towns, receive
different minimum transfers. See below for details on central towns.
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method (Hadi, 1992). This is done only for presentational convenience and does affect only
four observations.
Within each of the weight brackets as defined in Table 1, the figure includes a least square
fit of transfers per capita against population size. The linear fits indicate that in general,
there is a negative relationship between population size and transfers (which as argued below
can presumably be explained by the fact that fiscal capacities increase with population size).
However, at the 5000, 7500, and 15000 thresholds, there are noticeable jumps in transfers per
capita. No such noticeable jump is observable at the 10000 threshold. And for municipalities
with more than 20000 inhabitants, there is even a noticeable drop in transfers per capita.
On balance, the location in a particular weight bracket appears to affect transfers per
capita in an expected way for municipalities with less than 20000 inhabitants: there are
significant discontinuities for all but the threshold at 10000 inhabitants. Regarding the
10000 threshold, note that the linear plot between population size and transfers per capita
for the 7501-10000 bracket has a different slope than in the other brackets. It appears
that the absence of a discontinuity at 10000 can be explained by the fact that increases in
population size do not decrease transfers as much as in the other weight brackets.
There are two reasons why this might be the case. The first is that certain municipalities
receive weights not according to the standard formula as described by Table 1 but according
to whether they are designated a “central town” (Mittelzentrum or Mittelzentrum mit Teil-
funktion eines Oberzentrums) by the most recent State Development Plan in 2000. These
towns are responsible for the provision of certain public goods with a wider geographical
scope. Inhabitants of these municipalities receive a weight of at least 125 irrespective of its
actual population size. The second reason is that the distribution of fiscally abundant munic-
ipalities that only receive the minimum transfers might not balanced within the 7501-10000
bracket. Panel b of Figure 3 therefore plots population size against transfers per capita after
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dropping central towns and fiscally abundant municipalities.9 In this figure, a noticeable
discontinuity is present at the 10000 threshold. Except for the bracket with 15000-20000
inhabitants, the negative relationship between population size and transfers continues to be
present as well.
In order to confirm that the discontinuities in transfers per capita at the thresholds are due
to the weighting formula in assessing fiscal need, Figure 4 plots the tax revenues per capita of
municipalities against their population size, both with and without central towns and fiscally
abundant municipalities. Within each bracket, a linear regression line is provided. Recall
that tax revenues are related to fiscal capacity as defined by the equalization law. If the
discontinuities in transfers per capita identified in Figure 3 are not due to the weighting for-
mula but are rather due to discontinuities in underlying economic or demographic variables,
they should show up in tax revenues per capita. As Figure 4 indicates, no discontinuities are
present in municipal tax revenues at the thresholds below 20000. In fact, the only thresholds
where a discontinuity can be observed is at 20000. Municipalities with just above 20000 in-
habitants appear to have distinctly higher tax revenues than municipalities just below 20000
inhabitants. But it is difficult to derive stark conclusions from this observation as the num-
ber of municipalities with more than 20000 inhabitants is limited. The apparent increase in
tax revenues at 20000 might be just due to chance. Still, the possibility of a discontinuity in
tax revenues at the 20000 threshold indicates that restricting the sample to municipalities
with less than 20000 inhabitants in the regressions is a reasonable strategy.
This graphical evidence suggests that the discontinuities in the weighting formula can be
used to identify the effect of transfers on local fiscal policy by means of instrumental variables
regressions. Conditional on population size, which is according to Figure 4 positively related
to tax revenues (and hence to fiscal capacity), dummy variables indicating the location of
9Note that I do not have data on fiscal capacity and fiscal need as assessed by the state government
during the equalization process. Therefore, I treat all municipalities that receive the minimum amount of
transfers for their population bracket in a given year as abundant.
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a municipality in a given weight bracket should be a significant predictor of the transfers
per capita it receives. That is, municipalities with more inhabitants should receive more
transfers per capita.
Table 2 presents OLS regressions where transfers per capita of Hessian municipalities in
the 2001 to 2010 period are regressed on dummy variables that are 1 for municipalities
that fall in a given year into the respective population brackets and 0 else. Municipalities
with less than 5000 inhabitants are the reference category. If the weighting formula in the
Hessian municipal equalization law really induces discontinuities in transfers per capita,
the dummy variables indicating the population brackets above the reference bracket should
display positive and increasingly larger coefficients.
In Model I of Table 2, only the the dummy variables are included. When other control
variables, in particular population size, is missing from the model, the dummy variables
indicating the population brackets above 5000 inhabitants displays negative coefficients. As
argued previously, this can be explained by the fact that larger municipalities have more tax
revenues and thus a higher fiscal capacity. Once population size is included in the model,
the dummy variables display positive and mostly increasing coefficients up until the 20000
threshold. Note that it does not matter whether population size is included only with a
linear polynomial (Model II) or with up to cubic polynomials (Model III).
Including time fixed effects (Model IV) and a set of time-varying control variables (Model
V) does not change the pattern that until the 20000 threshold, municipalities in higher pop-
ulation brackets receive increasingly higher transfers per capita. In particular, note that
including a variable measuring the size of the municipal council does not change the findings
regarding the population brackets. This is important as there is some (but not complete)
overlap in the population thresholds defining the weights in the equalization formula and
population thresholds that determine council size according to the Hessian municipal elec-
toral law. That is, the council size increases discontinuously at 3000, 5000, 10000, and 25000
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inhabitants. To identify the effect of transfers, it might hence be important to include this
variable. In addition to council size, I include as control variable demographic variables (pop-
ulation share of above 65 and below 15 year old), and dummy variables indicating whether
a municipality has been designated a central town or is fiscally abundant.
Overall, the results in Table 2 confirm that the dummy variables indicating the different
population brackets can serve as strong instruments for transfer receipts for municipalities
which have fewer than 20000 inhabitants.
4 Empirical model
I estimate models of the following form to study the causal effect of transfers on local
expenditures and taxation:
yit = a+ Transfers per capitait + δyi,t−1 + γf(Population size)it + βxit + ǫit, (1)
where y is either real expenditures per capita (deflated by the CPI to 2005 values), the
business tax multiplier, or the property tax multiplier. f(Population size) is a polynomial
function of population size (I include up to cubic terms). x is a vector of additional control
variables. I also include in all regressions the lagged dependent variable yt−1 to account for
persistence in the outcome variables.
The variable of interest is real transfers per capita (deflated by the CPI to 2005 values).
To account for the endogeneity of real transfers per capita, I instrument transfers with the
dummy variables that indicate the various population brackets. The identifying assumption
is that the sample is sufficiently homogeneous to ensure that the dummy variables induce
quasi-random variation in transfers once population size, i. e. the treatment determining
variable, is controlled for. The validity of this assumption can be checked by means of
over-identification tests. An alternative test is proposed by Altonji et al. (2005a,b). In the
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current context, their approach boils down to estimating models with and without control
variables, and to investigate whether the estimates for the potentially endogenous variable
change between these two sets of models. If the instrument induces quasi-random variation in
the endogenous variable, the coefficient estimates should not differ much between these two
sets of models. Moreover, including additional control variables might increase efficiency.
I use the control variables included in Table 2. Of these the dummies indicating central
towns and abundant municipalities might be particularly important as indicated by Figure
3. It might also be important to control for council size as it is a discontinuous function of
population size.
I estimate Model (1) for all outcome variables with TSLS.10 To account for for het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation, I use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust stan-
dard errors. Weak identification is tested with the Cragg-Donald and Kleinbergen-Paap F
statistics (Baum et al., 2002). The Kleinbergen-Paap F statistic is robust to non-i.i.d er-
rors, but there are no critical values available with which to evaluate the statistic. The
Cragg-Donald F statistic is not robust, but the statistic is easier to evaluate. In addition, I
provide in the appendix the first-stage of the baseline regressions, including the first-stage
F-statistics and the coefficient estimates for the instruments. Over-identification is tested
with the Hansen-J statistic.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 3 presents the results for (real) total municipal expenditures per capita. I first report
OLS regressions and then compare the TSLS results. The OLS model suggests that transfers
10Note that since Model (1) does not include municipal fixed effects in addition to the lagged dependent
variable, the issue of the Nickel-Bias (Nickell, 1981) does not arise.
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result in lower expenditures per capita. However, the TSLS models show that this finding
is presumably due to endogeneity, i. e. the TSLS regressions result in a positive coefficient
estimate for transfers per capita. One explanation for the negative coefficient in the OLS
regression is that municipalities that have lower fiscal capacity receive more transfers and
spend at the same time less. Once transfers per capita are instrumented with the population
bracket dummies, their effect on expenditures per capita turns positive. In fact, an increase
in transfers per capita of 1 Euro increases expenditures by slightly more than 1 Euro. This
result provides strong evidence in favor of the flypaper effect.
It is curious that an increase in transfers by 1 Euro increases expenditures by more than
1 Euro, according to Model (V) even by about 1.5 Euro. This indicates very high levels
of crowding in of local expenditures by transfers. One plausible explanation for this result
is that municipalities use expenditures to attract additional tax bases (for example by im-
proving local infrastructure), and that this increases local tax revenues, which in turn allows
regions to increase expenditures even further. The regressions in Table 3 appear to capture
the overall reduced form effect of transfers on expenditures.
Table 4 presents the results for the business tax multiplier. Transfers appear to be irrele-
vant for taxation. Only in the last model, a weakly negative effect can be observed. However,
the effect is numerically small. The estimates indicate that an increase in transfers per capita
by 100 Euros reduce the business tax multiplier by 2.5 points. Given that the average mul-
tiplier was around 300 during the sample period, this effect is economically unimportant.
Overall, no meaningful effect of transfers on business taxation can be observed.
Finally, Table 5 presents the results for the property tax. The results are similar to
those for the business tax multiplier. The effect of transfers per capita is both statistically
insignificant and numerically small. Overall, it appears that transfers have no effect on
taxation. In particular, they are not used to decrease levels of taxation.
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5.2 Robustness checks
Table 6 reports the result of several robustness checks based on the baseline models. In
the panel of Table 6 entitled Linear control function, I include only a linear function of
population size to check whether the results were driven by the particular functional form
of the control function. The results are not noticeably different, however. When no control
variables are included, the estimated coefficient for transfers per capita in the expenditure
model turns insignificant. However, the z-statistic continues to be relatively large and the
coefficient is close to 1. Once additional control variables are included, transfers have a
statistically significant positive effect. The effect of transfers on tax policy is both statistically
insignificant and numerically small according to this robustness check.
In the panel entitled Quadratic control function, I include a quadratic control function.
The results regarding the effect of transfers are even closer to the baseline results than when
a linear control function is included. Overall, the results are robust to the choice of the
control function.
In the panel entitled Different thresholds, I test how applying different values for the
thresholds changes the estimates. The rationale for this robustness check is as follows. In the
Hessian equalization law, municipalities that transition into a lower population bracket will
continue to receive the weight of the next higher bracket for another year if their population
has only declined by less than 10% of the threshold they have crossed. For example, a
municipality whose population declines from 11000 to 9001 will continue to receive the
weight intended for the 10000 to 15000 bracket for another year. Now there have been
only very few transitions during the sample period, and it might appear that this feature
of the law can be ignored. The problem is the 7500 threshold. If the population of a
municipality falls below the 7500 threshold, it will continue to receive the weight for the
7501-10000 threshold indefinitely and not only for a year as long as its population size
remains within the 10% limit (i. e. is above 6750). Unfortunately, I do not have data on
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which municipalities with population sizes above 6750 but below 7500 have been treated with
the weights intended for the 7500-10000 during the sample period. As a concise check of
the robustness of the results to differently defined thresholds, therefore, I report regression
results where all thresholds have been redefined such that they are 10% lower. That is,
instead of associating a weight of 107 to municipalities with less than 5000, this weight is
only associated with municipalities with up to 4500 inhabitants. A weight of 114 is associated
with municipalities with population size between 4500 and 6750. A weight of 121 is associated
with municipalities with a population size between 6750 and 9000 etc.
The results for this robustness check are reasonably similar to the baseline findings. That
is, transfer per capita appear to increase expenditures per capita. While the coefficient is
insignificant, the z-statistic is large once control variables are added. Moreover, the coefficient
estimate is close to one. The lower significance values of the coefficient can presumably be
explained by the fact that the redefined threshold do not accurately capture the true weights
that the municipalities received during the equalization process.
The panel entitled municipalities with less than 30000 inhabitants reports regressions
where all municipalities with fewer than 30000 inhabitants are included in the sample. While
the results for taxation do not differ much from the baseline results, transfers appear to have
no effect on expenditures when no control variables are included. In fact, the estimated
coefficient for transfers is negative even if the z-statistic is very low. Once control variables
are included, the coefficient turns positive and displays a relatively large z-statistic. Note
that the instruments are not weak in these regressions. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
is around 17 while the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic is at least over 8.
The fact that the coefficient is negative in the regressions without control variables but
turns positive once control variables are included suggests that municipalities with over 20000
inhabitants are qualitatively different from municipalities with less than 20000 inhabitants for
reasons not directly related to population size. Consequently, the assumption of conditional
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independence of the instruments is violated once the sample in expanded to include such
municipalities, leading to biased coefficient estimates. Including additional control variables
to explicitly control for some of the qualitative differences appears to reduce the bias, leading
to a coefficient for transfers that is positive, close to one, and which displays a reasonably
large z-statistic.
In order to confirm that qualitative difference of such magnitudes only emerge for munic-
ipalities with population sizes above and below 20000 but not for lower thresholds, I report
in the panel entitled municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants regressions where all
municipalities with a population size larger than 15000 have been dropped. Here, the re-
sults are not qualitative different from the baseline estimates. The most notable difference
is that transfers appear to have an even larger effect on expenditures within this subgroup
of municipalities. An increase in transfers per capita by 1 Euro increases expenditures per
capita by about 2 Euros.
Finally, I report in the panel entitled Clustered standard errors regressions where hypothe-
sis tests and diagnostic tests have been calculated with clustered standard errors. While the
baseline regressions control for autocorrelation by relying on Newey-West standard errors, it
might be worthwhile to allow for arbitrary forms of over-time correlation in municipal trans-
fers receipts. On the other hand, allowing for arbitrary correlation by means of clustered
standard errors could lead to unnecessarily large standard errors.
Indeed, the main difference between the results from this robustness check and the baseline
models is that the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic is smaller. Nevertheless, transfers
continue to display a statistically significant effect on expenditures while being insignificant
for taxation.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how transfers affect local expenditures and taxation by exploiting a
natural experiment in the German State of Hesse. Identification is facilitated by disconti-
nuities in the allocation formula for general purpose grants to Hessian municipalities. Using
these discontinuities in a instrumental variables framework, this paper provides strong evi-
dence in favor of the flypaper effect. This finding is not only in line with recent results by
Dahlberg et al. (2008), who apply a similar methodology for Sweden, but also with much of
the early empirical literature on the flypaper effect.
While the effects of transfers are similar to those found for Sweden, it is still to early to
conclude that the flypaper effect is a general phenomenon of local public finance because
evidence based on quasi-experimental methods remains scare. Moreover, some of the existing
quasi-experimental contributions, e. g. Knight (2002) and Gordon (2004), contradict the
findings both in this paper and in Dahlberg et al. (2008). More evidence is therefore required
to reach definite conclusion on the existence or absence of the flypaper effect. It should be,
however, possible to obtain such evidence as it is likely that local transfer systems around
the world will provide many more opportunities to exploit natural experiments.
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Table 1: Thresholds for population
weights in the Hessian fiscal
equalization law
Population Weight
<= 1 2
> 1 and <= 5000 107
> 5000 and <= 7500 114
> 7500 and <= 10000 121
> 10000 and <= 15000 124
> 15000 and <= 20000 126
> 20000 and <= 30000 127
> 30000 and <= 50000 129
> 50000 130
a This table presents the weights per inhabitant each munic-
ipality within different population brackets receives in de-
termining its fiscal need. Thresholds according to Anlage
1 of the Hessian Gesetz zur Regelung des Finanzausgleichs
(FAG).
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Table 2: Equalization transfers and population thresholds, Hes-
sian Municipalities, 1991-2010
I II III IV V
b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z
Bracket=5001-7500 -14.087*** 1.391 24.943*** 25.597*** 24.663***
(-2.857) (0.254) (3.241) (3.438) (3.136)
Bracket=7501-10000 -4.332 26.639*** 65.182*** 65.399*** 64.080***
(-0.665) (3.144) (5.058) (5.219) (5.809)
Bracket=10001-15000 -23.033*** 28.831*** 75.538*** 76.413*** 74.307***
(-4.682) (2.879) (4.631) (4.849) (5.267)
Bracket=15001-20000 -29.292*** 48.945*** 92.295*** 93.064*** 99.000***
(-3.964) (3.254) (4.270) (4.424) (5.679)
Bracket=20001-30000 -90.042*** 26.205 45.148 44.456 74.345***
(-15.666) (1.226) (1.590) (1.593) (3.323)
Bracket=30001-50000 -117.694*** 66.878** 37.107 36.276 79.403***
(-17.778) (2.091) (1.032) (1.025) (2.788)
Council size 0.650
(0.922)
Population share <15 16.195***
(8.412)
Population share >65 9.021***
(13.111)
Central town 10.252*
(1.938)
Abundant municipality -146.714***
(-41.188)
Population (linear) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population (cubic) No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes
N 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131
Municipalities 414 414 414 414 414
F 85.440 81.347 64.483 45.649 133.710
a This table presents OLS regressions with population size and the population thresholds in the Hessian
fiscal equalization law. The dependent variable is (real) transfers per capita. These regressions relate
transfers per capita to the thresholds at 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000, 20000, and 30000 at which the
weight of each municipal inhabitant increases discontinuously in the equalization formula. In Model II,
population size is included linarly. Model III-V include linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of popuation
size. The last model (Model V) also includes additional control variables. All Hessian municipalities
except twelve special status cities are included in the sample. Outliers as identified by the Hadi-method
are excluded.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
b z-statistics in parentheses.
c z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.
Table 3: Equalization transfers and expenditures, Hessian
Municipalities, 2001-2010, OLS and TSLS regressions
OLS TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z b/z
Transfers per cap. -0.394*** 1.265** 1.197** 1.562**
(-4.518) (2.015) (1.991) (2.415)
Expenditurest−1 0.621*** 0.703*** 0.716*** 0.662***
(14.944) (14.054) (14.274) (13.857)
Council size -2.694
(-1.001)
Population share <15 -31.076**
(-2.325)
Population share > 65 -7.011
(-1.029)
Central town 30.603
(1.180)
Abundant municipality 458.064***
(4.359)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
N 3295 3295 3295 3295
Municipalities 370 370 370 370
F 94.576 54.316 39.880 42.577
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.318 0.322 0.121
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 14.061 15.783 18.296
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 7.278 7.969 9.170
a This table presents OLS and TSLS regressions with the (real) total expenditures per capita as de-
pendent variable. The independent variable of interest is (real) transfers per capita. Instruments
for transfers per capita in the TSLS regressions are dummy variables for each weight bracket. The
sample is restricted to all municipalities with population size below 20000. Outliers as identified
by the Hadi-method are excluded.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
f The first-stage regressions for the TSLS estimations can be found in Table ?? in the appendix.
Table 4: Equalization transfers and business tax multipliers,
Hessian Municipalities, 2001-2010, TSLS regressions
OLS TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z b/z
Transfers per cap. 0.001 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025*
(1.008) (-1.618) (-1.615) (-1.719)
Business tax multipliert−1 0.971*** 0.958*** 0.957*** 0.955***
(145.432) (83.878) (81.862) (89.414)
Council size -0.032
(-0.543)
Population share <15 0.023
(0.093)
Population share > 65 0.337**
(2.071)
Central town -0.173
(-0.368)
Abundant municipality -5.152**
(-2.118)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
N 3298 3298 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370
F 4894.824 4782.948 2080.329 1815.413
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.797 0.852 0.553
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 7.385 8.068 10.880
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 4.165 4.560 6.052
a This table presents OLS and TSLS regressions with the local business tax multiplier as dependent
variable. The independent variable of interest is (real) transfers per capita. Instruments for
transfers per capita in the TSLS regressions are dummy variables for each weight bracket. The
sample is restricted to all municipalities with population size below 20000. Outliers as identified
by the Hadi-method are excluded.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
f The first-stage regressions for the TSLS estimations can be found in Table ?? in the appendix.
Table 5: Equalization transfers and property tax multipli-
ers, Hessian Municipalities, 2001-2010, TSLS regres-
sions
OLS TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z b/z
Transfers per cap. -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005
(-0.497) (0.223) (0.248) (0.242)
Property tax multipliert−1 0.962*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.950***
(193.285) (70.230) (72.615) (98.776)
Council size 0.009
(0.116)
Population share <15 -0.806**
(-2.270)
Population share > 65 0.110
(0.627)
Central town -0.515
(-0.738)
Abundant municipality -0.806
(-0.253)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
N 3298 3298 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370
F 8883.875 8932.653 3628.130 2840.704
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.090 0.092 0.083
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 8.592 9.187 12.331
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 4.629 4.871 6.471
a This table presents OLS and TSLS regressions with the local business tax multiplier as dependent
variable. The independent variable of interest is (real) transfers per capita. Instruments for
transfers per capita in the TSLS regressions are dummy variables for each weight bracket. The
sample is restricted to all municipalities with population size below 20000. Outliers as identified
by the Hadi-method are excluded.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
f The first-stage regressions for the TSLS estimations can be found in Table ?? in the appendix.
Table 6: Equalization transfers and fiscal policy, Hessian Municipalities, 2001-2010, TSLS re-
gressions, Robustness checks
With control variables Without control variables
Expenditures Business tax Property tax Expenditures Business tax Property tax
1. Linear control function
Transfers per cap. 0.925 -0.017 0.037 1.224* -0.020 0.030
(1.393) (-1.238) (1.491) (1.776) (-1.417) (1.358)
N 3295 3298 3298 3295 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
F 47.317 2479.449 3569.505 49.076 2001.749 2786.602
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.044 0.887 0.406 0.006 0.875 0.405
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 11.623 9.019 7.826 14.541 11.205 11.036
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 5.964 5.308 4.064 7.973 7.058 6.439
2. Quadratic control function
Transfers per cap. 0.974* -0.019 0.013 1.285** -0.026* 0.009
(1.765) (-1.510) (0.693) (2.088) (-1.828) (0.480)
N 3295 3298 3298 3295 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
F 43.339 2307.307 3760.554 46.163 1879.710 2922.183
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.066 0.911 0.060 0.006 0.759 0.058
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 16.931 10.931 9.467 18.232 12.471 12.754
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 8.658 6.454 5.162 9.445 7.373 6.924
3. Different thresholds
Transfers per cap. 0.699 0.003 -0.019 0.913 -0.010 -0.006
(0.866) (0.122) (-0.640) (1.468) (-0.699) (-0.324)
N 3295 3298 3298 3295 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
F 44.010 2396.826 3465.663 46.239 2105.993 2878.405
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.224 0.424 0.120 0.421 0.341 0.091
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 6.355 3.005 3.564 15.590 10.312 10.004
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 3.536 1.761 2.047 8.804 5.663 5.372
4. Municipalities with less than 30000 inhabitants
Transfers per cap. -0.096 0.002 0.021 0.747 -0.013 0.005
(-0.170) (0.171) (1.171) (1.174) (-1.018) (0.257)
N 3569 3574 3574 3569 3574 3574
Municipalities 399 399 399 399 399 399
F 43.298 2755.897 3686.700 41.861 2313.325 3010.264
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.000 0.452 0.147 0.000 0.310 0.237
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 17.848 18.903 12.867 17.035 14.570 13.084
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 9.625 11.512 8.026 8.254 8.156 7.009
5. Municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants
Transfers per cap. 2.180** -0.041 -0.027 2.648*** -0.030 -0.036
(2.259) (-1.426) (-0.884) (2.757) (-1.321) (-1.164)
N 3019 3021 3021 3019 3021 3021
Municipalities 338 338 338 338 338 338
F 28.596 1538.935 3149.573 30.197 1568.422 2449.921
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.382 0.851 0.574 0.781 0.451 0.705
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 10.038 4.050 4.729 13.126 5.968 6.989
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 5.300 2.290 2.573 7.115 3.376 3.692
6. Clustered standard errors
Transfers per cap. 1.197 -0.025 0.005 1.562** -0.025 0.005
(1.554) (-1.367) (0.233) (1.987) (-1.537) (0.226)
N 3295 3298 3298 3295 3298 3298
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
F 39.246 1520.337 3333.389 48.713 1419.934 2600.999
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.614 0.908 0.052 0.303 0.620 0.053
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 15.783 8.068 9.187 18.296 10.880 12.331
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic 2.225 1.287 1.366 2.667 1.819 1.949
a This table presents several robustness checks on how equalization transfers affect fiscal policy based on the baseline regressions presented in Tables 3, 4,
and 5. The following robustness checks are conducted . First, instead of a cubic control function for population size, the models reported in row 1 use a
linear control function while the model reported in row 2 use a quadratic control function. The results reported in row 3 are obtained after redefining the
transfer thresholds such that they are 10% lower than the baseline thresholds. The results in row 4 are from regressions where all municipalites with less
than 30000 inhabitants are included in the sample. The results in row 5 are from models where only municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants are
included. Results in row 6 are for models where standard errors are clustered at the level of municipalities.
b All models include as control variables the lagged dependent variable and time fixed effects. The first three colums for each robustness check report results
for these models. The last three colums report results where additonal control variables are included.
Table 7: Definition of Variables
Label Description
Transfers per cap. Real unconditional transfers per capita
(Schlu¨sselzuweisungen).
Expenditures per cap. Real total expenditures per capita (sum of current
and capital expenditures).
Business tax multiplier Business tax multiplier (Gewerbesteuerhebesatz )
which determines the effective business tax rate
in a municipality.
Property tax multiplier Property tax multiplier (Grundsteuer B Hebesatz )
which determines the effective property tax rate in
a municipality.
Bracket=5001-7500 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥5001 &
≤7500, else 0.
Bracket=7501-10000 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥7501 &
≤10000, else 0.
Bracket=10001-15000 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥10001 &
≤15000, else 0.
Bracket=15001-20000 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥15001 &
≤20000, else 0.
Bracket=20001-30000 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥20001 &
≤30000, else 0.
Bracket=30001-50000 Dummy variable = 1 if population size ≥30001 &
≤50000, else 0.
Population Population size municipality.
Council size Number of members in the municipal council.
Population share <15 Population share of municipal inhabitants younger
than 15.
Population share >15 Population share of municipal inhabitants older
than 65.
Central town Dummy= 1 if municipality designated as central
town (Mittelzentrum) by ?.
Abundant municipality Dummy=1 if municipality receives in a given year
only the minimum transfers to which it is eligable
according to its population size.
Most of the data was obtained from the Hessische Gemeindestatistik available
at http://www.statistik-hessen.de. Fiscal variables are deflated with
the federal CPI obtained from the German Council of Economic Experts
(Sachversta¨ndigenrat at http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de).
Information on central towns was obtained from the Landesentwicklungs-
plan Hessen 2000 available at http://www.landesplanung-hessen.de.
Information on the council size threshold was obtained from
http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/hessen.html. Finally, fiscally abundant
municipalities are defined as those municipalities that receive the minimum
transfers per capita as stipulated by the Hessian municipal equalization law
(available online at http://www.rv.hessenrecht.hessen.de).
Table 8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transfers per cap. (real) overall 163.709 90.205 3.937 1048.123 4135
between 79.081 5.668 341.267 414
within 43.535 -108.302 939.245 9.988
Expenditures per cap. (real) overall 1648.492 466.716 403.748 7636.820 4136
between 362.981 1057.717 5352.759 414
within 293.866 1.499 6529.229 9.990
Business tax multiplier overall 323.327 26.289 200.000 430.000 4140
between 25.114 250.000 400.000 414
within 7.862 235.327 386.327 10
Property tax multiplier overall 257.443 36.469 140.000 400.000 4140
between 33.470 140.000 366.000 414
within 14.568 170.443 386.443 10
Population overall 10.204 7.845 0.622 43.741 4140
between 7.851 0.678 43.293 414
within 0.170 9.180 11.169 10
Council size overall 30.956 7.600 15.000 45.000 4140
between 7.535 15.000 45.000 414
within 1.054 23.756 38.156 10
Population share <15 overall 9.712 1.048 5.992 14.097 4140
between 0.858 6.908 12.518 414
within 0.604 5.866 12.822 10
Population share > 65 overall 19.466 2.818 11.462 31.762 4140
between 2.425 13.843 29.997 414
within 1.441 13.343 23.993 10
Central town overall 0.227 0.419 0.000 1.000 4140
between 0.419 0.000 1.000 414
within 0.000 0.227 0.227 10
Abundant municipality overall 0.068 0.252 0.000 1.000 4140
between 0.195 0.000 1.000 414
within 0.160 -0.832 0.968 10
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Figure 1: Distribution of population size This figure describes the number of municipalities in Hesse
with a given population size. .
Hesse
Figure 2: Geographical location of Hesse.
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Figure 3: Transfers per capita and population size: This figure presents a a scatter
plot of (real) transfers per capita against population size. Vertical lines mark the thresholds at
which the weight of inhabitants increases discontinuously (at 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000, 20000 and
3000). Within each bracket, the data is fitted linearly. Outliers as identified by the Hadi-method
are excluded.
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Figure 4: Tax revenues per capita and population size: This figure presents a a scatter
plot of (real) tax revenues per capita against population size. Vertical lines mark the thresholds
at which the weight of inhabitants increases discontinuously (at 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000, 20000 and
3000). Within each bracket, the data is fitted linearly. Outliers as identified by the Hadi-method
are excluded.
Appendix
Table A.1: Equalization transfers and ex-
penditures, Hessian Municipalities,
2001-2010, First stage of the TSLS
regressions in Table 3 (Expendi-
tures)
TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z
Bracket=5001-7500 30.837*** 32.400*** 20.363**
(3.674) (4.008) (2.314)
Bracket=7501-10000 71.253*** 73.802*** 59.893***
(4.941) (5.233) (4.827)
Bracket=10001-15000 63.647*** 67.563*** 40.758**
(3.201) (3.482) (2.136)
Bracket=15001-20000 74.895*** 77.782*** 53.372**
(2.956) (3.137) (2.318)
Expenditurest−1 -0.052*** -0.056*** -0.036***
(-8.978) (-9.721) (-7.617)
Council size 2.472**
(2.267)
Population share <15 15.250***
(7.209)
Population share > 65 9.821***
(12.496)
Central town 10.902*
(1.760)
Abundant municipality -147.534***
(-29.381)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes
N 3295 3295 3295
F 18.402 25.807 102.963
a This table presents the first-stage regressions for the TSLS regressions
reported in Table 3.
b The dependent variable is whether a state is ruled by a coalition gov-
ernment.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation and autocorrelation robust standard errors.
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Table A.2: Equalization transfers and ex-
penditures, Hessian Municipalities,
2001-2010, First stage of the TSLS
regressions in Table 4 (Business
tax multiplier)
TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z
Bracket=5001-7500 23.304*** 24.531*** 19.931**
(2.830) (3.111) (2.240)
Bracket=7501-10000 55.751*** 57.513*** 50.668***
(3.876) (4.100) (4.127)
Bracket=10001-15000 60.933*** 65.268*** 46.115**
(3.053) (3.356) (2.424)
Bracket=15001-20000 78.243*** 82.178*** 65.533***
(3.052) (3.276) (2.869)
Business tax multipliert−1 -0.466*** -0.497*** -0.422***
(-5.742) (-6.230) (-6.354)
Council size 1.542
(1.378)
Population share <15 13.746***
(6.191)
Population share > 65 9.650***
(12.025)
Central town 5.094
(0.814)
Abundant municipality -165.164***
(-38.280)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes
N 3298 3298 3298
F 12.875 19.523 106.543
a This table presents the first-stage regressions for the TSLS regressions
reported in Table 4.
b The dependent variable is whether a state is ruled by a coalition gov-
ernment.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation and autocorrelation robust standard errors.
Table A.3: Equalization transfers and ex-
penditures, Hessian Municipalities,
2001-2010, First stage of the TSLS
regressions in Table 5 (Property
tax multiplier)
TSLS I TSLS II TSLS III
b/z b/z b/z
Bracket=5001-7500 22.292*** 22.929*** 19.572**
(2.813) (2.992) (2.257)
Bracket=7501-10000 58.645*** 59.650*** 55.026***
(4.184) (4.335) (4.505)
Bracket=10001-15000 64.267*** 67.006*** 52.714***
(3.235) (3.442) (2.761)
Bracket=15001-20000 77.448*** 79.307*** 70.131***
(2.990) (3.112) (3.027)
Property tax multipliert−1 0.647*** 0.632*** 0.415***
(12.136) (11.987) (8.264)
Council size 1.256
(1.153)
Population share <15 16.170***
(7.516)
Population share > 65 7.351***
(8.751)
Central town 2.686
(0.417)
Abundant municipality -160.908***
(-42.129)
Population (cubic) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes
N 3298 3298 3298
F 27.150 26.383 134.944
a This table presents the first-stage regressions for the TSLS regressions
reported in Table 5.
b The dependent variable is whether a state is ruled by a coalition gov-
ernment.
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
d z-statistics in parentheses.
e z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation and autocorrelation robust standard errors.
